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Abstract
The revelation principle asserts that for any indirect mechanism and equilibrium,
there is a corresponding direct mechanism with truth as an equilibrium. Although
the revelation principle has been a fundamental theorem in the theory of mechanism
design for a long time, so far the costs related to strategic actions of agents have
not been fully discussed. In this paper, we propose the notion of prot function,
and claim that the denitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism and
Bayesian incentive compatibility should be based on the prot function instead of
the utility function when strategies of agents are costly. After then, we derive two
key results: (1) The strategic action of each agent in a direct mechanism is just to
report a type, and each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred
in any indirect mechanism; (2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of
revelation principle is wrong. We construct a simple labor model to show that
a Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable,
which contradicts the revelation principle.
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in mechanism design theo-
ry [1{3]. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whin-
ston and Green (Page 884, Line 24 [3]): \The implication of the revelation
principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully
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implementable." Put in other words, the revelation principle says: \suppose
that there exists a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium" (Page 76, Theorem 2.4, [4]). Relevant denitions about the
revelation principle are given in Section 2, which are cited from Section 23.B
and 23.D of MWG's textbook [3].
Generally speaking, agents may spend some costs when participating a mech-
anism. There are two kinds of costs possibly occurred in a mechanism: 1)
strategic costs, which are possibly spent by agents when performing strategic
actions 1 ; 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly spent by agents when re-
porting types falsely. 2 In the traditional literature of mechanism design, costs
are usually referred to the former. Recently, some researchers began to inves-
tigate misreporting costs[6,7]. For every type  and every type ^ that an agent
might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [7] dened a cost function as c(; ^)
for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case where c(; ^) = 0
everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where c(; ^) 2 f0;1g
[8,9]. Kephart and Conitzer [7] proposed that when reporting truthfully is
costless and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two kinds
of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the
revelation principle holds or not when two kinds of costs are considered. The
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose the notion of prot
function (see Note 1), and claim that the denitions of Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be based on
the prot function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents are
costly (see Denition 23.D.1' and Denition 23.D.3'). After then, we derive
two key results:
(1) Each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type. Hence
each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect
mechanism (see Proposition 1);
(2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle in
Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2).
In Section 3, we construct a simple labor model, then dene a social choice
function f and an indirect mechanism, in which strategies of agents are costly.
In Section 4, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 3). In Section 5, we show that
f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under some
conditions (see Proposition 4), which contradicts the revelation principle. In
the end, Section 6 draws conclusions.
1 For example, agents spend education costs in a job market [5].
2 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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2 Analysis of strategic costs
In this section, we will investigate costs spent by agents when playing strategies
in a mechanism. In the beginning ,we cite some denitions from Section 23.B
and Section 23.D of MWG's textbook [3] and make comments.
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i pri-
vately observes his type i that determines his preferences. The set of possible
types of agent i is denoted as i. The agent i's utility function over the out-
comes in set X given his type i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Note 1: Generally speaking, when an agent performs a strategic action in
participating a game, he usually needs to spend some monetary costs (or
make some eorts which can be quantied as monetary costs). Assume each
agent's costs are only relevant to his strategic action and private type, and
are independent of the game outcome.
Formally, suppose each agent i with private type i 2 i chooses a strategy si
and performs a strategic action si(i), then his strategic costs can be denoted
as ci(si(i); i).
3 Suppose the nal outcome is x 2 X, then each agent i's
prot can be denoted as:
pi(x; si(i); i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si(i); i): (1)
Denition 23.B.1 [3]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : 1 
    I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types 1;    ; I ,
assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3 [3]: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection
of I strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI !
X. A mechanism can be viewed as an institution with rules governing the
procedure for making the collective choice. The allowed actions of each agent
i are summarized by the strategy set Si, and the rule for how agents' actions
get turned into a social choice is given by the outcome function g(). The
mechanism   combined with possible types (1;    ;I), probability density
(), and Bernoulli utility functions (u1();    ; uI()) denes a Bayesian game
of incomplete information.
Denition 23.B.5 [3]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ,
g0()) in which S 0i = i for all i and g0() = f() for all  2 1     I .
Note 2: In a direct mechanism, each agent's strategy can be viewed as an
3 Here ci(si(i); i) is similar to ci(i; ^i) given by Kephart and Conitzer [7], except
that the order of arguments is opposite.
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oral and costless announcement: i:e:, the strategy of each agent i with private
type i is to choose a type s
0
i(i) 2 i to report, and s0i(i) does not need to be
his private type i. After the designer receives all reports s
0
1(1);    ; s0I(I),
he must announce the outcome f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)).
Denition 23.D.1 [3]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji] (2)
for all s^i 2 Si.
Note 3: In Denition 23.D.1, the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a mechanism is based on the utility function. Generally, in an indirect mech-
anism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent i's strategy si(i) is an action that
requires some costs to be performed, i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0. Obviously, the u-
tility function ui(x; i) only describes the utility of agent i after obtaining the
outcome x but misses his costs, thus cannot describe the prot of agent i 4 .
Actually, the prot function should be used to dene the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of a mechanism. Formally, Denition 23.D.1 should be reformulated
as follows:
Denition 23.D.1' The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [pi(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); s

i (i); i)ji]  E i [pi(g(s^i; s i( i)); s^i; i)ji]
(3)
i:e:,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si, in which pi is the prot of agent i given by Eq (1).
Denition 23.D.2 [3]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
4 In most of practical cases, strategies of agents are costly actions. Only in very
limited cases (e:g:, where strategies of agents are purely oral announcements) can
strategies be viewed costless. Thus, the traditional denition of Bayesian Nash e-
quilibrium holds only in these limited cases.
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Denition 23.D.3 [3]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i,
g0 = f . That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Note 4: In the direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), for each agent i with
private type i, there are two cases as follows:
1) If he reports truthfully, i:e:, s0i(i) = i, then ci(i; i) = 0 by Footnote 2,
and pi(x; s
0
i(i); i) = ui(x; i) by Eq (1).
2) If he reports falsely, i:e:, s0i(i) = ^i 6= i, then there may exist misreporting
costs ci(^i; i), and pi(x; s
0
i(i); i) = ui(x; i)  ci(^i; i) by Eq (1).
Similar to Note 3, the prot function should also be used to dene the notion
of Bayesian incentive compatibility. Following Denition 23.D.1', Denition
23.D.3 should be reformulated as follows:
Denition 23.D.3' The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s0i (i) = i
for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
revelation mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i, g0 = f . That
is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)  ci(^i; i)ji]; (4)
for all ^i 2 i, in which ci(^i; i) is the cost for agent i with private type i to
misreport ^i 2 i. 5
Proposition 1: The strategy of each agent i in the direct mechanism  0 =
(S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()) is just to report a type from i. Each agent i does not need
to take any other action to prove himself that his reported type is truthful, and
should not play any strategic action as specied in any indirect mechanism.
Hence, in a direct mechanism, each agent does not need to spend any strategic
cost related to strategic actions specied in any indirect mechanism.
Proof: As pointed out in Denition 23.B.5, in the direct mechanism  0, the
strategy set S 0i = i, which means that the strategy s
0
i of agent i with private
type i is just to choose a type from i to report, i:e:, s
0
i(i) 2 i. Obvious-
ly, the designer cannot enforce each agent to report truthfully, and each agent
5 If the misreporting cost ci(^i; i) = 0 for each agent i, then Denition 23.D.3' is
reduced to Denition 23.D.3.
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does not need to take any action to prove himself that his reported type is truth-
ful. Otherwise, assume to the contrary that each agent i has to prove himself
that his reported type is truthful. Then there will be no information disadvan-
tage from the viewpoint of the designer : the agents' types are no longer their
private information, and the designer can directly specify his favorite outcome
f(1;    ; I) after receiving agents' reports 1;    ; I . This case contradicts
the basic framework of mechanism design, therefore the assumption does not
hold.
Hence, each agent i with true type i will misreport another type s
0
i(i) 6= i
whenever doing so is worthwhile. After the designer receives s01(1);    ; s0I(I),
he has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not. What the
designer can do is just to announce f(s01(1);    ; s0I(I)) as the outcome. Thus,
it is wrong to assume that in a direct mechanism the designer can require each
agent perform any strategic action specied in any indirect mechanism. As a
result, in a direct mechanism, each agent i does not need to spend any strategic
cost related to strategic actions specied in any indirect mechanism. 2
Discussion 1: Someone may disagree with Proposition 1. According to the
revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Appendix), for a giv-
en social choice function f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism   that
implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consider this equilibrium, there
is a mapping from vectors of agents' types into outcomes. Now we take the
mapping to be a revelation game, i:e:, each agent chooses a type to report to
the designer, and the designer suggests each agent an action which he would
take in Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism  . Then no type
of any agent can benet by deviating from reporting his true type and per-
forming the suggested action. As a result, the notion of direct mechanism is
extended and each agent still spends the same strategic costs as what they
would spend in the indirect mechanism.
Answer 1: It should be noted that behind the revelation game, there actually
exists an underlying assumption: Each agent i is willing to inform the designer
his strategy si() chosen in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced
by the indirect mechanism. Only when this assumption holds can the designer
know which action he should suggest to each agent i after receiving an ar-
bitrary prole of agents' reported types, since the suggested action for each
agent i is just what agent i would take in Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
indirect mechanism.
However, the strategy of each agent i is his private function si : i ! Si,
which describes his individual choice si(i) for each possible type i 2 i
that he might have [3]. In the framework of mechanism design, the designer
is ALWAYS at the information disadvantage: he does not know neither the
private type i of each agent i, nor the strategy function si() that describes
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how each agent i chooses a type to report. What the designer knows are
only the agents' reported types s1(1);    ; sI(I). It is wrong to imagine that
each agent will voluntarily reveal his private information to the designer (or a
virtual mediator) without obtaining any more prot. 6
To sum up, the logic of the extended direct mechanism consists of two steps: 1)
At rst each agent i is assumed to be willing to reveal his private information
(i:e:, strategy function si()) to the designer, 2) Next, each agent i will nd
it optimal to reveal his private information (i:e:, private type i) to the de-
signer and perform the suggested action si(i). This is just circular reasoning.
Consequently, the argument does not hold. 2
Proposition 2: Given an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), if each
strategic action si(i) is costly, i:e:, ci(si(i); i) > 0, then the proof of the
revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong.
Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (see Appendix), suppose
that there exists an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements
the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists
a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that the mapping g(s()) :
1      I ! X from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into an
outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome f(), i:e:, g(s()) = f()
for all  2 1     I . By Denition 23.D.1', for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Thus, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s

i (^i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (^i); i))ji]
for all ^i 2 i.
Since g(s()) = f() for all , then for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(f(i;  i); i) ci(si (i); i))ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i) ci(si (^i); i))ji];
(5)
for all ^i 2 i. Note that this inequality cannot infer the inequality in Def-
inition 23.D.3', which represents the sucient condition of Bayesian incen-
tive compatibility. Consequently, the proof of the revelation principle given in
Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong. 2
6 The notion of direct mechanism dened in MWG's book does not need the so-
called assumption (see Denition 23.B.5, [3])
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3 A labor model and a social choice function f
Here we construct a labor model to show revelation principle does not always
hold. The labor model uses ideas from the rst-price sealed auction model in
Example 23.B.5 [3] and the signaling model [3,5]. There are one rm (i:e:, the
designer) and two agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 dier in the number of units
of output that they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted by private
productivity type. The rm chooses wage w > 0 and wants to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible, and the two agents compete for this job.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two agents are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each agent i's productivity type i (i = 1; 2) is his private information.
2) There is a certicate that the rm can announce as a hire criterion. If each
of (or neither of) two agents has the certicate, then each agent will be hired
with probability 0.5. The education level corresponding to the certicate is
eH > 0. Each agent decides by himself whether to get the certicate or not,
hence the possible education level ei of each agent i = 1; 2 is eH or 0. The
education level does nothing for an agent's productivity.
3) The strategic cost of obtaining education level ei for agent i (i = 1; 2)
with productivity type i is given by a function ci(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the
strategic cost is lower for a higher productivity agent.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity agent to report the high-
productivity type H is a xed value cmis  0. In addition, a high-productivity
agent is assumed to report the low-productivity type L with zero costs.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that agent i gets the job. Recall that the rm does not know
the exact productivity types of two agents, and its aim is to hire an agent
with productivity as high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social
choice function f() = (y1(); y2()), in which  = (1; 2), yi (i = 1; 2) is the
probability that agent i gets the job.
y1() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
;
f() = (y1(); y2()) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
: (6)
In order to implement the above social choice function f(), the rm designs an
indirect mechanism   = (S1; S2; g) as follows: Each agent i = 1; 2, conditional
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on his type i 2 fL; Hg, chooses his education level as a bid ei : fL; Hg !
f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of agent i's all possible bids, and the
outcome function g is dened as:
g(e1; e2) = (g1; g2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if e1 = eH ; e2 = 0
(0:5; 0:5); if e1 = e2
(0; 1); if e1 = 0; e2 = eH
; (7)
where gi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that agent i gets the job.
Let u0 be the expected utility of the rm, then u0(e1; e2) = g11 + g22   w.
Let u1; u2 be the utilities of agent 1; 2, and p1; p2 be the prots of agent 1; 2
in the indirect mechanism   respectively, then for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(ei; ej; i) =
8>><>>:
w; if ei > ej
0:5w; if ei = ej
0; if ei < ej
; (8)
pi(ei; ej; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ci(ei; i) = ui(ei; ej; i)  ei=i: (9)
The item \ei=i" in Eq (9) stands for the strategic costs spent by agent i with
private type i when he performs the strategy ei in the indirect mechanism.
7
Suppose the reserved utilities of agent 1 and agent 2 are both zero, then the
individual rationality (IR) constraints are: pi(ei; ej; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
4 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 3: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f()
given in Eq (6) is Bayesian implementable, i.e., it can be implemented by the
indirect mechanism   given by Eq (7) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, agents with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
e1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; e2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (10)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume ej(j) (j = 1; 2) takes this form, i:e:,
ej(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (11)
7 For the case of ei < ej , there will be ei = 0.
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then we consider agent i's problem (i = 1; 2; i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg,
agent i solves a maximization problem: maxei h(ei; i), where by Eq (9) and
Footnote 7, the object function is
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=i)P (ei > ej(j)) + (0:5w   ei=i)P (ei = ej(j)) (12)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=L)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=L)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; L) < h(0; L), which means the optimal
value of ei(L) is 0. In this case, e

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then e

j(j) = 0 by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > 0) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0:5w; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then e

j(j) = eH by Eq (11).
h(ei; i) = (w   ei=H)P (ei > eH) + (0:5w   ei=H)P (ei = eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if ei = eH0; if ei = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; H) > h(0; H), which means the optimal
value of ei(H) is eH . In this case, e

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
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then the strategy ei (i) of agent i
ei (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (13)
will be the optimal response to the strategy ej(j) of agent j (j 6= i) given
in Eq (11). Therefore, the strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises
the individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (9) and Eq (13),
the (IR) constraints are changed into: 0:5w   eH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2
(2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq (7) and Eq (13), for any
 = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(e1(1); e

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (14)
which is the social choice function f() given in Eq (6). Thus, f() can be
implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
5 The Bayesian implementable f is not truthfully implementable
In this section, we will show by the following proposition that a Bayesian
implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which
means that the revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of
agents are costly.
Proposition 4: If the misreporting cost cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), then the social choice
function f() given in Eq (6) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  0 = (1;2; f()), in which
1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  = (1; 2) 2 1  2. Each agent i (i = 1; 2) with
private type i reports a type ^i 2 i to the rm 8 . Then the rm performs
the outcome function f(^1; ^2) as specied in Eq (6).
According to Proposition 1, in the direct mechanism, each agent i only reports
a type and does not spend the strategic costs. The only possible cost needed
8 Here ^i may not be equal to i.
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to spend is the misreporting cost cmis for a low-productivity agent to falsely
report the high-productivity type H . For agent i (i = 1; 2), if his true type is
i = L, by Eq (9) his prot function will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   cmis; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (15)
If agent i's true type is i = H , his prot function will be as follows:
p0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (16)
Note that the item \ei=i" occurred in Eq (9) disappears in Eq (15) and
Eq (16), because each agent i does not spend strategic costs in the direct
mechanism. Following Eq (15) and Eq (16), we will discuss the prot matrix
of agent i and j in four cases. The rst and second entry in the parenthesis
denote the prot of agent i and j respectively.
Case 1: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
Case 2: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent i is to falsely report ^i = H , otherwise agent i would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
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Case 3: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = H , j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for agent i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for agent j is to falsely report ^j = H , otherwise agent j would
truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
Case 4: Suppose the true types of agent i and j are i = L, j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   cmis)
H (w   cmis; 0) (0:5w   cmis; 0:5w   cmis)
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost 0  cmis < 0:5w, the dominant
strategy for both agent i and agent j is to falsely report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique equilibri-
um of the game induced by the direct mechanism  0 is to xedly report
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the unique outcome of  
0 is that each agent has the
same probability 0.5 to get the job oer. Consequently, the truthful report
^i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the di-
rect revelation mechanism. By Denition 23.D.3, the Bayesian implementable
social choice function f() given in Eq (6) is not truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the conditions of w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) and
cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), which means that the revelation principle does not always
hold when strategies of agents are costly. 2
Discussion 2: Someone may argue that the labor model is not fundamentally
dierent from an auction where making a bid is costly in the sense that the
bidder has to pay the bid amount if he wins the object. The only dierence
is that in the labor model, the education cost is not paid to the rm. How-
ever, this dierence is immaterial since the payment of the education cost is
veriable by the rm.
Answer 2: In the label model, after the rm announces the outcome function
(see Eq (7)), each agent i individually chooses his education level ei to be 0 or
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eH (i:e:, decides whether to undergo the education and produce the certicate).
For each agent i, it is the education level ei rather than the private education
cost ci = ei=i that acts as his bid. Thus, the labor model is fundamentally
dierent from the standard auction in that each agent i's bid ei only reects
what his choice is (i.e., whether to obtain the certicate or not), but does not
reect how much he pays for his choice (i.e., the value of his education cost is
not veriable by the rm). Hence, the argument does not hold. 2
Discussion 3: Someone may argue that the labor model considers two dier-
ent economic environments:
1) In the case in which the social choice function is Bayesian implementable
(Proposition 3), each agent needs to get some education before working at the
rm and has to spend the cost of obtaining an education level.
2) On the other hand, in the case in which the social choice function is not
truthfully implementable (Proposition 4), each agent does not need to get any
education to work at the rm and hence there is no education cost.
The dierence between these two cases might be interpreted as the dierence
in sets of feasible outcomes rather than that in mechanisms the rm uses.
Answer 3: This argument omits the reason why there are these two dierent
cases.
1) In the former case the agents participate the indirect mechanism. Each
agent is required by the indirect mechanism to choose an education level, and
thus needs to spend the corresponding education cost.
2) In the latter case, the agents participate the direct mechanism. Each agent
is required by the direct mechanism to report a type, and thus does not need
to spend any education cost except for possible misreporting costs.
Thus, the dierence in two sets of feasible outcomes is just from the dierence
in two mechanism the rm uses. 2
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates strategic costs and misreporting costs simultaneous-
ly spent in a mechanism. In the beginning, we propose the notion of prot
function, and claim that the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mech-
anism should be based on the prot function instead of the utility function
when strategies of agents are costly. After then, the denitions of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatibility are revised (see Def-
inition 23.D.1' and Denition 23.D.3', Section 2). This is the key point why
the proof of revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see
Proposition 2). Since strategies of agents are usually costly actions in most
of practical cases (see Footnote 4), the revelation principle holds only in very
limited cases where strategies of agents can be viewed costless.
14
In Section 3, we propose a simple labor model. Section 4 and Section 5 give
detailed analysis about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism, the prot of each agent is given by Eq (9), and
the separating strategy prole (e1(1); e

2(2)) is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
when wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social choice function f can be
implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) In the direct mechanism, the prot of each agent is modied from Eq (9)
to Eq (15) and Eq (16). Under the condition of cmis 2 [0; 0:5w), the unique
equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism is to xedly report
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the truthful report is no longer the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, which means that the revelation principle does not hold in this
case.
3) Dierent from Kephart and Conitzer [7], the revelation principle can fail to
hold even when misreporting cost cmis = 0 (see Proposition 4).
Appendix
Proposition 23.D.1 [3]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that
implements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1) 9 , the condition for
f() to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
9 The condition (23.D.1) is given in Denition 23.D.3, Section 2.
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